Firm entry deregulation, competition and returns to education and skill by Ferreira, Priscila et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
No. 48 
 
 
 
Firm Entry Deregulation, Competition 
and Returns to Education and Skill 
 
 
Ana P. Fernandes 
Priscila Ferreira 
L. Alan Winters 
 
 
April 2013 
 
  Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada 
Universidade do Minho 
Firm Entry Deregulation, Competition and Returns to
Education and Skill
Ana P. Fernandesy
University of Exeter
Priscila Ferreiraz
University of Minho, NIMA
L. Alan Wintersx
University of Sussex, CEPR, CEP and IZA
February 2013
Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect of rm entry deregulation on the returns to skill and edu-
cation. We use matched employer-employee data for the universe of workers and rms in
Portugal and exploit a comprehensive episode of entry deregulation, unique in the industri-
alized world, as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate how increased competition a¤ects
wages. We nd that after the reform the returns to a university degree increased by around 5
percent and the returns to skills increased by around 3 percent. We include match (worker-
rm) xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ect from individuals who stay in the same rm
after the reform. Results are therefore not driven by changes in employment composition,
and are supportive of education and skill becoming more valuable after the reform.
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1 Introduction
All countries regulate rm entry but the extent and nature of the regulations vary widely across
the world.1 Overly-restrictive regulations are likely to be ine¢ cient and have knock-on e¤ects
on competition, innovation, employment, wages and economic growth. Deregulation, and in
particular the removal of restrictions on rm entry, has been a signicant policy recommendation
during the last few decades. Aghion et al. (2009) exploit a number of policy reforms in the
UK during the Thatcher era to study how entry a¤ects innovation and productivity growth by
incumbent rms. Aghion et al. (2008) study the e¤ects of dismantling the License Raj in India
on registered manufacturing output, entry, employment and investment. The e¤ects are found
to di¤er across states with di¤erent labor market regulations. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)
show that entry regulation in the retail trade industry in France had a negative e¤ect on job
creation and employment growth.
This paper exploits an episode of comprehensive entry deregulation as a quasi-natural ex-
periment, and uses linked employer-employee data of the universe of the private sectors rms
and workers in Portugal to investigate the e¤ects of deregulation on entry, competition and the
returns to education and skill. In July 2005, the new government established the "On the Spot
Firm" program.2 This initiative was created to reduce the time, cost and complexity of starting
a business. Prior to 2005 to start a business an entrepreneur would need to visit several public
o¢ ces and it took 11 procedures, 20 forms and 78 days, making it slower than in any other
EU country, and the fees were around 13.5% of GDP per capita.3 The "On the Spot Firm"
program created one-stop shops where entrepreneurs can register a company in a single visit in
less than an hour and at a cost of around 3% of GDP per capita. As a result of this reform,
Portugal went up in the World Bank "Doing Business" index from 113th to 26th.
A large body of literature has shown that entry and competition spur productivity growth
and innovation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2009; Djankov, 2006; Gri¢ th and Harrison, 2004; Gri¢ th,
2001; and Blundell, Gri¢ th, and Van Reenen, 1999), which suggests that the issue is of some
importance as European governments search for institutional policies to boost economic growth.
This paper contributes to this search by identifying the e¤ects of a single precisely dened policy
reform. We use the deregulation reform in Portugal as an exogenous source of increased product
market competition and provide quasi-natural experimental evidence of the e¤ects on wages.
We exploit the cross-time and cross-municipality variation in the implementation of the business
registration reform for identication to measure its e¤ects on the returns to education and skill,
1Djankov et al. (2002) report that while in Italy an entrepreneur needs to follow 16 di¤erent procedures, pay
US$3946 in fees, and wait at least 62 business days to acquire the permits to start a business, an entrepreneur in
Canada can nish the process in two days by paying US$280 in fees and completing only two procedures.
2Decreto-Lei 111/2005
3World Bank (2006).
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resulting from the increase in competition.4 The unusually rich and detailed information from
the employer-employee dataset Quadros de Pessoal allows us to obtain estimates that account
for individual- or match (rm-worker)-specic unobserved heterogeneity, as well as changes in
industry composition and regional e¤ects.
The theoretical mechanism that underlies the link between product market competition and
returns to skill or education is based on principal-agent theory. Schmidt (1997) and Raith
(2003) investigate the e¤ect of competition on the distribution of prots across rms, and how
executive compensation responds to changes in competition. In these models, compensation
is the result of a two-stage game in a principal-agent setting. Vives (2004), develops a more
general model to analyze the e¤ect of competition on relative prots and on product and process
innovation.
These models consider the agency problem between owners and managers, but their implic-
ations can be applied more broadly to other workers in the rm. In particular, if as product
markets become more competitive, prots become more sensitive to costs, rms can reduce
production costs either by incentivizing managers or by hiring more skilled workers. In this
scenario the motives for managerial incentives also hold for rewarding skills or education. As
discussed in Guadalupe (2007), to the extent that skilled workers are more productive than
unskilled workers, increased product market competition may induce rms to compete with
each other to hire high-skilled workers, which translates into higher returns to skill.
Our results show that the business registration reform had a positive and statistically sig-
nicant e¤ect on the number of new rms created. These results are consistent with what has
been reported in other studies of the e¤ect of deregulation on rm entry (see for example Bruhn
(2011) who uses a similar rm entry deregulation in Mexico). In particular, we nd that, on
average, municipalities with one-stop shops observed around 4.3 additional new rms being
created within each industry per year. We also nd that the deregulation had a negative and
statistically signicant e¤ect on industry concentration ratios and on the Herndahl-Hirschman
index (HHI), suggesting that it increased competition within industries.
Commonly used measures of competition, such as concentration ratios or the Herndahl-
Hirschman index face a number of clear limitations discussed in the literature, including poten-
tial endogeneity, correlation with omitted variables, non-monotonicity. The main contribution
of our paper is therefore to exploit the "on-the-spot rm" business registration reform as an
exogenous source of increased competition to present quasi-natural experimental evidence of
the e¤ects of competition on the returns to skill and education. Our results suggest that after
the reform the returns to having a university degree increased by around 5%, while the wage
premium to being high-skilled increased by around 3%. We control for individual xed e¤ects
4The program expanded over time to municipalities across the country and by the end of 2009 there were
164 one-stop shops dispersed throughout Portugal (see Figure 1) in the next section.
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thus eliminating potential bises arising from unobserved individual characteristics. We also
control for industry, municipality and year e¤ects to parse out any industry or region char-
acteristics or business shocks that might a¤ect our outcomes. In some of our specications
we control for rm-worker (match) xed e¤ects, and the wage premium to education and skill
remains similar in magnitude and statistical signicance. In those specications, the e¤ect of
the reform on returns to education and skill is identied from individuals who stay in the same
rm or in the same industry after the deregulation. This suggests that the wage e¤ect reects
not merely higher wages in new jobs but is commensurate with education and skills becoming
more valuable after the reform.
Our paper is related to the literature that has studied the e¤ects of large U.S. deregulations
on wages. This literature has focused mainly on deregulation in a single industry. In particular,
Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) and Card (1986, 1996) study the e¤ect of deregulation in the
airline industry in the U.S. on relative earnings of air transport workers. Hirsch (1993) and Rose
(1987) analyze wage responses to deregulation in the trucking industry. Black and Strahan
(2001) and Wozniak (2007) study the e¤ect of deregulation in the U.S. commercial banking
industry on the wages of workers. Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the e¤ects
of an economy-wide episode of entry deregulation, which reduced red tape and increased rm
entry across industries, on the returns to education and skills, a di¤erent aspect of the wage
structure.5
Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ects of international trade on wages.
Closely related to our paper, Guadalupe (2007) studies the e¤ect of increased competition,
resulting from the European Single Market Program and the 1996 appreciation of the British
pound, on the returns to skill. Verhoogen (2009) proposed a new mechanism linking trade and
wage inequality: quality upgrading due to increased exports. Using the late-1994 peso crisis
as a source of variation he shows that quality upgrading induced by the exchange rate shock
increased within-industry wage inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature and the
theoretical background. In section 3 we describe the "on the spot rm" business registration
reform in Portugal. Section 4 describes the data used and presents descriptive statistics. Sec-
tion 5 performs correlation analysis between industry concentration ratios and HHI (common
measures of competition) and returns to education and skill. Section 6 studies the e¤ect of the
"on the spot rm" program on the creation of new rms, and on industry concentration ratios
and HHI. Section 7 presents the quasi-natural experiment and discusses the results of the e¤ect
of the deregulation on returns to education and skill. The last section concludes.
5Wozniak (2007) and Guadalupe (2007) are two notable exceptions that have studied wage inequality.
Wozniak (2007) studies the e¤ect of deregulation in the banking industry on wage inequality for banking employ-
ees. Guadalupe (2007) studies the e¤ect of foreign competition on returns to skill.
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2 Theoretical Background and Related Literature
To the extent that the business registration reform analyzed in this paper reduced entry barriers,
it increased competition in the product market. We analyze this hypothesis in section 6 below,
before we investigate the e¤ects of the increased competition on the returns to education.
The theoretical link between product market competition and compensation is analyzed by
Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) in a principal-agent setting. They investigate the e¤ect of
product market competition on the distribution of prots across rms, and how this a¤ects
the compensation scheme. In Schmidt (1997) the competitive environment in which the rm
operates a¤ects the contracting between the manager (agent) and the shareholder (principal).
Although in this model the employee is modeled as the manager, its predictions could also be
applied to any other workers in the rm. An increase in product market competition reduces
prots and has two e¤ects on the incentives to exert e¤ort. On one hand it induces the manager
to work harder for a cost reduction to avoid liquidation and keep her job, and the owner to
provide steeper incentives to the manager. On the other hand, if competition reduces the value
of a cost-reduction to the owner, he may want to provide atter incentives. Overall the e¤ect
of competition on incentives is ambiguous.
Raith (2003) allows for entry and exit of rms. As a result of increased competition, prices
and prots decrease leading some unprotable rms to exit. This restores the original prot
level and eliminates the opposing e¤ects of a fall in prots present in Schmidt (1997). The
model predicts unambiguously that an increase in competition leads rms to provide stronger
incentives to their managers to reduce costs. Vives (2004) provides a more general model to
analyze the e¤ect of competition on product and process innovation. The net e¤ect of an
increase in competition on cost-reducing investments depends on both the residual demand
and the elasticity of residual demand faced by the rm. The net e¤ect is ambiguous for most
measures of competitive pressure. For example, an increase in the number of competitors will
decrease the residual demand for the rm and increase the demand elasticity. The st e¤ect
tends to decrease R&D e¤ort while the second tends to increase it, as a unit decrease in costs
will decrease price with a higher e¤ect on output.
The e¤ect of changes in competition on the various aspects of compensation to managers
and other skilled workers is also an empirical question, which has received some attention in
the literature. This previous literature, however, has focused mainly on deregulation in a single
industry. In particular, Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) and Card (1986, 1996) study the e¤ect
of deregulation in the airline industry in the U.S. on relative earnings of air transport workers.
Hirsch (1993) and Rose (1987) analyze wage responses to deregulation in the trucking industry.
The authors nd that union premia over nonunion wages declined sharply after the deregulation.
Black and Strahan (2001), Wozniak (2007) and Cuñat and Guadalupe (2008) study the e¤ect of
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deregulation in the U.S. commercial banking industry on the wages of workers and executives
compensation in the banking sector. Our paper adds to this literature by investigating the
e¤ects of an economy-wide episode of entry deregulation, which reduced red tape and increased
rm entry across industries, on the returns to education and skills, a di¤erent aspect of the
wage structure.
Another strand of the literature has studied the e¤ects of international trade on wages.
Closely related to our paper, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Guadalupe (2007) study the
e¤ect of increased competition, resulting from the European Single Market Program and the
1996 appreciation of the British pound, on wages and the returns to skill. The former nd
an increase in the performance pay sensitivity of compensation, particularly for executives,
and the latter that the returns to skill increased with the increase in competition. Verhoogen
(2009) proposed a new mechanism linking trade and wage inequality: quality upgrading due
to increased exports. Using the late-1994 peso crisis as a source of variation he shows that
quality upgrading induced by the exchange rate shock increased within-industry wage inequality.
Finally, our paper is related to the general and vast literature on wage inequality. 6
3 Entry Deregulation in Portugal: The "On the Spot Firm"
Program
In 2005, the Portuguese Ministry of Justice implemented a program aimed at reducing red
tape and alleviating the bureaucratic burden associated with setting up a new rm. To start a
business in Portugal prior to 2005 an entrepreneur would need to visit several public o¢ ces and
it took 11 procedures, 20 forms and 78 days, making it slower than in any other EU country.
The total expenses were around 13.5 % of GDP per capita.7 As a result, Portugal ranked 113
out of 155 countries in the Doing Business index of the World Bank. In March 2005 a new
Prime Minister took o¢ ce and in May the government created the Unit for Coordination of
Administrative Modernization (UCMA) to bring together the Ministries of Justice, Finance,
Economy and Labour and Social Security, which were all involved in starting a business. The
main job of the UCMA was to coordinate and aggregate measures by the di¤erent ministries.
The "On the Spot Firm" (Empresa na Hora) program was created to reduce the time,
cost and complexity of starting a business.8 This initiative established one-stop shops where
entrepreneurs can register a company in less than an hour. It brings all the agencies into a single
o¢ ce so entrepreneurs do not need to visit several public o¢ ces to get the required documents
6See the seminal contributions by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), and
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998). See also Wood (1994) for evidence on international trade and globalization; and
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) for the consequences of organizational
change. Machin (1997) and Card (2001) study the e¤ect of labour market institutions.
7This compares with an average of 6.8% in the OECD (World Bank, 2006).
8http://www.empresanahora.pt/ENH/sections/EN_homepage
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and procedures. In the one-stop shops, the legal and commercial registration is completed and
the company identication card, the corporate tax payer number and the social security number
are all handed over in the same day. All the details are then sent to the tax authorities to ensure
the security of the incorporation procedures for new companies.
The law that creates the "On the Spot Firm" was issued in July, and in the same month
pilot one-stop shops were launched in four municipalities.9 The program expanded over time
and by the end of 2009 there were 164 one-stop shops dispersed in municipalities throughout the
country. By the end of 2010 the number increased to 199, covering most of mainland Portugal
and the autonomous region of Madeira.10 Figure 1 below gives a graphical representation of
the opening dates and geographical spread of the one-stop shops between 2005 and 2009.11 An
entrepreneur can register a new company under the "on the spot Firm" program in any of the
one-stop shops located across Portugal. However, as documented by Branstetter et al. (2010),
the fraction of rms registered outside their local municipality is trivially small.
[Figure 1 about here]
In 2007, the average time to set up a company through the "On the Spot Firm" was 47
minutes, with one procedure at one o¢ ce desk. By 2008, over 70% of new rms were established
through the "On the Spot Firm".12 As a result of this program, Portugal is now one of the
easiest countries to start a business, and the cost is around 3% of GDP per capita. Portugal
was cited by the World Bank as "Top reformer" in business entry in 2006. The reform in 2005-
2006 became part of a larger package for administrative and legislative simplication called
"Simplex". This program is one of the most successful initiatives for red tape reduction in the
industrialized world.13
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main data source used in this paper is the Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal data
set with linked information on workers and rms based in Portugal. These data have been
collected annually by the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and answering
the survey is legally mandatory for all rms employing at least one worker. The data include
9Coimbra, Aveiro, Barreiro and Moita.
10Administratively, Portugal is divided into 308 municipalities. The municipality is the seat of local adminis-
trative and executive power.
11The program allows registration of all companies (single-shareholder companies, private limited companies,
partnerships or public limited companies) except state-owned companies or rms in industries with industry-
specic requirements, or which require special permits. These are mainly in the nance, insurance and transport-
ation sectors; see Branstetter et al, 2010 for more details, and for a list of industries which cannot be registered
on the one-stop shops. We exclude observations in these industries from our analysis.
12See http://www.empresanahora.pt/ENH/sections/EN_homepage
13See Branstetter et al., 2010 for a more detailed description of the on the spot rmrm programme and
for opening dates of all one-stop shops between 2005 and 2009.
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all rms (over 250 thousand per year) and employees (more than two million per year) within
the Portuguese private sector. In 2009, the most recent year for which the data is available, the
dataset includes over three million workers and about 400 thousand rms. Each rm and each
worker have a unique registration number which allows them to be traced over time.14
In general, the information refers to the situation observed in the month of October of each
year, when the survey is collected, and it covers the rm, each of its plants and each of its
workers. Information on workers includes, for example, gender, age, education level (schooling),
level of skill, occupation, type of contract of employment, hiring date in the rm, promotions,
monthly hours of work (normal and overtime) and earnings, which are split into each of its
components (base wage, seniority payments, regular and irregular benets, overtime pay).
Firm level data include, for example, the year of creation, industry, location, total number
of workers, number of establishments, sales volume, legal structure and ownership structure
(equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign). The administrative nature of
the data and its public availability at the workplace, as determined by law, result in a high
degree of coverage and reliability.15
The second data source used in this paper is the International Trade dataset collected by the
Portuguese National Institute of Statistics (INE). This dataset includes the universe of monthly
export and import transactions by rms that are located in Portugal. The data comes from
customs return forms for extra-European Union trade. For intra-EU trade, the data is collected
through the INTRASTAT declaration form supplied to INE. For this paper we use data on
export transactions only, aggregated to the rm-year level.
We focus our analysis on the decade in which the "On the Spot Firm" program was in-
troduced. Therefore, for the combined data set which merges the two data sources described
above, we use data collected each year from 2002 to 2009.16 We restrict our analysis to the
private sectors manufactures and services, excluding agriculture, shing and mining. Table A.1
in appendix reports the description (and the percentage distribution of observations) of the SIC
2-digit industries considered.
The resulting sample is composed of 431,692 distinct rms (contributing with 1,871,296 rm-
year observations) and 3,899,878 workers (contributing 16,485,860 worker-year observations)
over the period. We identify the creation of new rms using the reported year the rm was
14Each rm entering the dataset is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number. The Ministry of Labor
and Social Security performs several checks to ensure that rms that have already reported are not assigned a
di¤erent identication number. Similarly, each worker is assigned a unique identifying number based on the social
security number. We use these identiers to follow workers and rms over time.
15The requirement of public availability facilitates monitoring by the Ministry of Employment of the rms
compliance with the law (e.g., with regard to illegal work). The data from Quadros de Pessoal has been used by
Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the rm size distribution; by Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to
compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets; by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) to study the di¤erence between
contractual and actual wages, among others.
16QP data were not collected in 2001, and hence our analysis starts in 2002 rather than 2000. 2009 is the
most recent year for which the data has been built.
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constituted. A rm is considered to be a start-up if the year of creation is equal to the year of
analysis. However, because the survey is collected in October, we recover some information on
rm births if the year of creation is equal to t  1, but the rm is observed for the rst time in
t. In these cases, we set the year of creation of the rm to t: The distribution of rms (existing
rms and rm startups) and workers per year are shown in Table 1. Over the sample period
there was a path of net rm and job creation, as the stock of rms and workers increased year
after year. In 2009 we start seeing the e¤ects of the global economic crisis and observe net
rm and job destruction. Regarding the "on the spot rm" program, in 2005 23% of the new
rms were created in municipalities with one-stop-shops, while after 2008 more than 70% were.
Overall, in our data, 42,567 rms were created within counties with one-stop-shops.
[Table 1 about here]
The monthly wage of the worker is constructed by summing: (i) the base pay gross amount
of money paid (in the reference month) to workers on a regular monthly basis for the normal
hours of work; (ii) tenure related payments; and (iii) regular payments. Real hourly wages, used
in our specications, are computed as real monthly wages (excluding overtime pay) divided by
normal monthly hours of work (excluding overtime hours). The Quadros de Pessoal matched
employer-employee data records information on both the education levels and the skill levels
attained by each worker. We exploit this information and investigate the e¤ects of the reform
on the returns to education, and also on the returns to skill.
The level of education (schooling) of individuals in the Quadros de Pessoal is recorded
according to the International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED), approved by UN-
ESCO in November 1997. The correspondence between ISCED levels and years of schooling
in Portugal is as follows: ISCED 1 up to primary education, includes the rst and second
stages of basic education in Portugal (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED 2 lower secondary
education, includes the third stage of basic education (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 upper
secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6 higher education, includes rst and
second stages of tertiary education (more than 15 years of schooling corresponding to university
degrees).17
Firms are also requested to classify workers into 8 levels of qualication according to the
complexity and responsibility of the tasks performed and the skill requirements of the task.
The 8 levels of qualication are: 1  Top executives (top management); 2  Intermediary
executives (middle management); 3 Supervisors, team leaders and foremen; 4 Higher-skilled
professionals; 5 skilled professionals; 6 semi-skilled professionals; 7 non-skilled professionals;
8 Apprentices, interns and trainees. Table A.2 in the appendix shows a detailed description
17 In Portugal, there is no degree corresponding to ISCED level 4; and it is not possible to distinguish between
ISCED levels 5 and 6 from the data.
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of the hierarchical levels and their skill content in accordance with the law.18 Each of these
hierarchical levels can be considered as a layer in an hierarchy dened in terms of increasing
responsibility and task complexity. For our analysis, the skill levels were collapsed into three
categories: high- (levels 1 to 4), medium- (level 5) and low-skilled workers (levels 6 to 8). We
also include the occupation as separate control in the regression analysis.
Our regressions include additional characteristics of the workers as covariates: gender, age
and tenure (and their squares), the type of contract of employment held (whether open-end or
closed-end contract), and occupation (7 categories).19 We also control for rm characteristics:
log of the size (size is measured by the number of workers employed by the rm), ownership
status (private, public or foreign owned, depending on wether more than 50% of the rms
social capital is owned by private, public or foreign investors), whether the rm is an exporter
and whether the rm is multi-plant. Industry, municipality (19 regions), and year dummies are
also included to control for unobserved municipality and industry-specic characteristics, and
aggregate shocks.
Descriptive statistics of the variables by education and skill levels are presented in Table 2.20
In our sample, 12% of the workers have a university degree, and 23% are high-skilled workers.
Medium-skilled workers represent the largest share (41%) of the labour force. Amongst the
high-skilled workers, 42% have a university degree or higher, this conrms that our measure of
skill is not a simple output of academic achievement of the workers. Conversely, 78% of highly
educated workers performs more complex (high-skilled) tasks. Regarding the "on-the-spot"
program, 41% of our observations are located in municipalities with one-stop shops.21
[Table 2 about here]
5 Industry Concentration and Returns to Education and Skill
This paper uses the "on the spot rm" entry deregulation reform in Portugal to investigate
whether rm entry deregulation increases the returns to education and skills through increased
product market competition. In this section, we start by documenting the correlation between
18See the Decreto Lei 121/78 of July.
19Occupations are recorded with six digits in accordance to the National Classication of Occupations 1994.
This is compatible with the International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO) 1988. We aggregate the
classication of occupations into ISCO-88s major groups. The major groups are: 1 Directors; 2 Intellectual
and scientic specialists; 3  Professional and technical (intermediate); 4 Administrative and managerial; 5
Clerical and sales workers; 6 Agriculture, silviculture and shing; 7 Production and related workers; 8 
Equipment operators and labourers, 9 unqualied workers.
For our analyses we cconsidered occupations 1 and 2 to be one group; and occupations 6 and 7 as another
single group.
20For the sake of clarity and space, descriptive statistics on region, industry and year are not shown, but can
be provided upon request to the authors.
21Since we want to interpret the e¤ect of the "on-the-spot" program on wages, we do not consider municipalities
of the last year of introduction of on-the-spot shops. This means that we removed all records (for all years)
associated to the municipalities for which the on-the-spot shops were introduced in 2009.
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competition and wages. We consider four commonly used measures of competition, dened at
the industry (SIC 2-digit), municipality and year level: industry concentration ratios dened
as the fraction of industry employment by the ve largest rms (CR5employment) or by the
fraction of industry sales accounted by the ve largest rms (CR5sales) within the municipal-
ity; and the HerndahlHirschman index of industry employment or of industry sales. These
measures are interpreted as inverse measures of competition. In the next section, we proceed
to our quasi-natural experiment and report reduced-form evidence on the e¤ect of the "on the
spot rm" program on the returns to education and skill.
In what follows, we exploit the panel variation to assess the relationship between compet-
ition and the returns to education and skill. We regress the logarithm of real hourly wages of
individual i; in rm j, in industry s, municipality m, with educational level (skill level) k in year
t on the measure of competition (CR5 or HHI), denoted by CIsmt, in the industry-year within
municipalities, and its interaction with education (skill), CIsmt Sikt (ISCED1 and low-skill are
the omitted categories), among other controls. We therefore run the following specication:
lnwijsmkt = + CIsmt + Sk;it + (CIsmt  Sk;it) + X 0it + Z 0jt + d() + ijsmkt (1)
Where CIsmt is one of the four concentration indicators of industry s; in municipality m, at
time t, and Sk;it is our measure of educational attainment (skill) of the worker, as described in
Section 4. X 0it is a vector of individual characteristics, Z
0
jt is a vector of rm characteristics (as
described in Section 4, Table 2). We control for unobserved permanent individual characteristics
(di), and include industry (ds) and time (dt) dummies to account for unobserved industry
characteristics and business shocks that a¤ect all rms and workers in a municipality. Our
coe¢ cient of main interest is : It captures the correlation between returns to education (skill)
and the industrys level of competition. If competition is positively correlated with the returns
to education (skill) then we expect the sign of  to be negative since concentration ratios and
HHI indices are inverse measures of industry competition.
Results from estimating model (1) using employment-based concentration ratios and HHI
as measures of competition are reported in Table 3. We obtain similar results, available upon
request, when using sales-based measures. The upper part of Table 3 reports results for the
e¤ect of competition on the returns to skill, while the lower panel of the table reports results for
the returns to education. Column (i) relates to a basic OLS specication which includes gender,
age and tenure (and their squares) of the worker as covariates, along with industry and year
dummies. In column (ii) we specify a within groups regression (i.e., we include individual xed
e¤ects, di) with the same set of covariates (except for gender); in column (iii) we specify the same
within groups regression model, but including dummies for education (skill) interacted with year
thus allowing for changes in returns to education (skill) over time in a exible way. Column (iv)
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further saturates the model with dummies for municipality, and includes the occupation and
type of contract of the worker, the log of size and the ownership of the rm, as well as whether
the rm is multiplant or exporter.
The results for returns to skill, reported in the upper panel of Table 3 show that the coe¢ -
cient of interest, on the interaction between the skill levels and the industry concentration ratio,
is negative and statistically signicant. This suggests a negative correlation between concentra-
tion and returns to skill. In other words, results suggest that when competition increases the
gap between high- and low-skill wages widens. Results obtained when using HHI to measure
competition are consistent with the ones using the CR5 measure. Results reported in the last
four columns of table 3 show a negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction
between skill levels and industry HHI. The coe¢ cients are also of similar magnitude.
The results for the correlation between industry concentration (or competition) and returns
to education, are reported in the lower panel of Table 3. Contrary to the results on returns to
skill, which show a clear negative e¤ect of increased concentration on the returns to skill, a dif-
ferential e¤ect of industry concentration by education levels in not found. The coe¢ cient on the
interaction between industry concentration and education levels is not statistically signicant,
regardless of the measure of concentration used, CR5 or HHI.
[Table 3 about here]
While the results shown in Table 3 suggest that an increase in industry competition is
related to larger returns to skill, the results are really only suggestive of correlations, because
the use of concentration ratios and HHI as proxies for industry competition faces a number of
clear limitations. These include: (i) the potential endogeneity resulting from the fact that these
measures of concentration are endogenous outcome variables from the implicit competition
parameters or barriers to entry; (ii) they are potentially non-monotonic in the competition
parameters, for example, as discussed in Sutton (1991), higher competition generated via a
reduction in entry barriers can lead to an increase in concentration in some industries; (iii)
potential correlations with an omitted variable such as technical change; (iv) the fact that,
conceptually, concentration ratios may not be good measures of competition. For example, as
documented in Boone (2000), if rms di¤er in e¢ ciency levels, an increase in competition can
drive ine¢ cient rms to exit the industry and thus increase concentration in the industry, not
decrease concentration.
Therefore, the results presented in this section should be regarded as descriptive rather than
showing of a causal e¤ect. To try to establish a causal link between increased competition and
returns to education and skill, in the sections that follow we use the "on the spot rm" program,
which increased rm entry across industries, as an arguably more exogenous source of increased
competition.
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6 "On the Spot Firm" Program, Firm Entry and Industry Con-
centration
Before presenting results from the quasi-natural experiment on the returns to education and
skill, we start by investigating the e¤ect that the "on the spot rm" program had on rm entry
and competition. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the validity of the "on the spot rm"
program as a source of increased competition. In this section we investigate whether the reform
of business registry increased rm entry and competition within industries. We do this by
estimating the e¤ect of the "on the spot rm" program on (i) the number of new rms created
(positive correlation expected) per year within a municipality; and on (ii) the concentration
measure (negative correlation is expected) of industry (s) in municipality (m) and year (t).
That is, we estimate the following model specications
NewFirmssmt = f(Spotmt; d()) (2)
CIsmt = f(Spotmt; d()) (3)
In all specications the "on the spot rm" dummy variable (Spotmt) takes the value of 1
for the year when and after an "on the spot rm" shop was introduced in municipality m in
year t, and 0 otherwise (see Figure 1 for an overview of opening dates of the "one-stop shops"
in Portuguese municipalities across the country). The dependent variable of model (3), CIsmt,
is one of the measures of industry concentration, dened in the previous section. For each
analysis we regress three model specications which include as regressors: (i) only the "on the
spot rm" covariate (Spotmt); (ii) "on the spot rm" dummy, and industry indicators to parse
out any industry characteristics that may a¤ect the outcomes (Spotmt and ds); and (iii) we
further saturate the model with year indicators (Spotmt, ds and dt) to control for industry
characteristics and year-specic factors.
The results of the analysis of the e¤ect of the "on the spot rm" program on the number
of new rms created in municipality m and year t (model 2) are displayed in Table 4. The top
panel of the Table relates to a linear model of the number of rms created, while the bottom
part relates to a negative binomial model for the same count data.
[Table 4 about here]
Our results suggest that the business registration reform increased the number of new rms
created. The coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is always positive and statistically signicant at
the 1% level. Looking at our negative binomial specication (bottom panel), the di¤erence in
the logs of expected counts of new rms is expected to be between 0.90 and 1.34 units higher
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if "on the spot" shops exist. In other words, on average, municipalities with "on the spot"
shops have around 4.3 more new rms being created within each industry per year (see ME on
Table 4, column iii). Therefore, the e¤ect of the "on the spot rm" program is economically
meaningful with respect to the predicted number of rms created.
Our results on rm entry are in line with those obtained by Branstetter et al. (2010) and
Bruhn (2011). Both these studies investigate the e¤ect of simplied business entry registration
reforms on the number of new rms created and on job creation. Branstetter et al. (2010)
use data for Portugal and the same deregulation episode that is being exploited in this paper.
The authors nd that the reform increased the number of new rms per 100,000 inhabitants by
around 17%. Using a similar reform in Mexico implemented from 2002, Bruhn (2011) nds a 5%
increase in the number of registered new businesses and a 2.2% increase in employment. The
e¤ect of this type of reform on the returns to education and skills has received little attention
in previous literature. This is the focus our study.
In table 5 we report results from estimating model 3, the e¤ect of the "on the spot rm"
reform on industry concentration, measured by the concentration ratio of the top 5 rms (CR5)
in terms of employment (top panel) and sales volume (bottom panel) within the industry. For
each measure of concentration, we report results from a linear regression model of the share
of employment by the top 5 employers within an industry (s) in municipality m and year t
in the top panel; while the bottom panel relates to a fractional dependent variable model of
the same dependent variable.22 Our results suggest a negative e¤ect of the reform on industry
concentration, the coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is always negative and and statistically
signicant. These results suggests that the business registration reform had a positive e¤ect on
industry competition.
[Table 5 about here]
Our results on the e¤ect of the "on the spot" rm on industry concentration also hold
when we measure it by the HerndahlHirschman indices (HHI). Estimates of model 3 using
the HHI of employment within industry (s) in municipality m and year t are displayed in the
top panel of Table 6, while the bottom panel relates to HHI of sales volume within industry
(s) in municipality m and year t: The upper part of each panel reports results from a linear
regression model, while the bottom part relates to a fractional dependent variable model of the
same dependent variable. The e¤ect of the reform on the HHI is negative (positive e¤ect on
competition), the coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is negative and statistically signicant.
[Table 6 about here]
22 In the fractional dependent variable specication we use a fractional probit as proposed by Papke and
Wooldridge (1996).
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In sum, results reported in tables 5 and 6 suggest that the business registration reform played
a signicant role in increasing competition within industries. Given the potential problems
associated with using concentration ratios and HHI as measures of competition, in the next
section we use the "on the spot rm" program as a an exogenous source of increased competition
to present quasi-natural experimental evidence of the e¤ects on the returns to education and
skills.
7 The Regulatory Quasi-Natural Experiment
The main results in this paper come from an exogenous event that reformed business registration
in Portugal. As shown in the previous section, this reform has lead to increased rm entry, and
is associated with increased product market competition, measured by concentration ratios and
HHI. In this section we investigate the e¤ect of the reform on the returns to education and
skills.
7.1 Empirical strategy
We use cross-municipality-specic and cross-time variation in the implementation of the business
registration reform in Portugal to identify the e¤ect of the deregulation on the returns to skill
and education. As discussed in Section 3, in order to alleviate the bureaucratic burden of setting
up an enterprise, the government that took o¢ ce in March 2005 approved the law that created
"on the spot rm" in July of the same year. This policy change was an unanticipated event, and
arguably constitutes an exogenous policy change in business registration that induced changes
in rm entry and industry competition.23
The one-stop shops are o¢ ces where entrepreneurs can register a new business in less than
an hour. These shops were initially established in only a few municipalities, but progressively
expanded to the rest of the country, as shown in Figure 1. Given that the timing of adoption
of the reform varied across municipalities, we can exploit this time variation in our identic-
ation strategy. We therefore provide di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates of changes in returns
to educational attainment and skill levels. Eligible rms (rms within eligible industries) and
individuals in municipalities with one-stop shops for business registration are the treatment
group.
Branstetter et al. (2010) have shown that early adopting municipalities, those that estab-
lished one-stop shops between July 2005 and June 2007) are not statistically di¤erent from late
adopting municipalities in a number of respects, such as: initial growth trends of total sales,
23Although there were also local elections in October 2005 for the municipality chief executive, the introduction
of on the spot rmshops seems unrelated with political a¢ liation. As discussed in Branstetter et al. (2010),
40% of the municipalities with one-stop shops had a Social Democrat municipality head, the main opposition
party.
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sales of new rms, number of rms, number of new rms. This supports our hypothesis, im-
portant for identication strategy, that administrative decisions to open one-stop shops are not
correlated with existing trends in rm creation or economic growth.
To investigate the e¤ects of the business registration reform on the returns to education and
skill we estimate the following model:
lnwijmkt = + Spotmt + Sk;it + (Spotmt  Sk;it) + X 0it + Z 0jt + d() + ijmkt (4)
where the dependent variable is the log of real hourly wages of worker i (in rm j, municipality
m with skill/education level k) in year t. Spotmt is our treatment dummy for municipalities
(m) with one-stop shops; it takes the value of 1 in the year when and after a one-stop shop was
introduced in the municipality.24 Sk;it is our measure of skills or educational attainment of the
worker (the levels Sk were described in Section 4). X 0it is a vector of individual characteristics,
which include age and tenure and their squares, occupation and type of contract; and Z 0jt is a
vector of rm (j) characteristics which include the log of rm size, ownership structure (whether
domestic private, public or foreign), a dummy for whether the rm is an exporter, and a dummy
for whether the rm is multi-plant. Industry (ds) and time (dt) dummies are also included in
all specications to account for unobserved industry characteristics and business shocks that
a¤ect all rms and workers.
We also control for municipality (dm) xed e¤ects to parse out any municipality-specic
factors that may a¤ect our outcomes. Although we exploit cross-municipality and cross-time
variation in the implementation of the reform, having a panel of linked employer-employee data
allows us to include individual and worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects in our specications, di
and dij , respectively. These e¤ects help controlling for potential biases arising from individual
heterogeneity on the patterns of job mobility and sorting of workers across rms/industries. As
discussed in Guadalupe (2007), unobserved time invariant worker e¤ects also serve as control
for compositional changes over time in observable characteristics within an industry. ijmkt is an
error term assumed to be white noise. In all of our specications standard errors are clustered
at the industry level to account for potential correlation between observations within the same
industry.
7.2 Results
Tables 7 and 8 report results from estimating equation (4). Two sets of analyses were conducted:
one to investigate the e¤ect of the rm entry reform on the returns to education (Table 7);
and a similar analysis to investigate the e¤ects on the returns to skill (Table 8). Observed
24Some municipalities have more than one one-stop shop. Our treatment dummy is set to 1 after the rst
shop was opened.
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characteristics of workers (X 0it) and rms (Z
0
jt), as explained in the previous sections, along
with industry (ds) and year (dt) dummies are always included. The di¤erent columns in tables
7 and 8 relate to di¤erent combinations of the other xed e¤ects included. In addition to
industry and year dummies, column (i) also controls for worker unobserved e¤ects (di), column
(ii) further adds in municipality xed e¤ects (dm) and column (iii) controls for match (rm-
worker) unobserved e¤ects (dij) and municipality dummies. The coe¢ cient on the Spotmt
variable, , captures the average e¤ect of the reform on the wages of the least educated or least
skilled workers (the omitted categories). The absolute e¤ects on other workers are given by the
sum of  and the relevant element of . Our main interest lies in , the vector of coe¢ cients
on the interaction terms between the experiment variable, Spotmt, and the educational (skill)
levels, Sk;it. Each of its elements (k) captures the e¤ect of the reform on the returns to di¤erent
educational and skill levels.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 reports the results on the returns to education. The interaction terms between
the educational levels and the reform dummy, are always positive and statistically signicant
at the 1% level. In particular, the coe¢ cient on the interaction between the ISCED 5/6 and
the treatment variable is 0.045, suggesting that after the introduction of the "on the spot
rm" program the returns to having a university degree increased by around 5%. Similarly, the
reform increased the returns to upper secondary education by around 2% relative to the omitted
category (primary education). Thus, our results suggest that the business registration reform is
associated with increased wage premia to better educated workers. These results are robust to
the inclusion of worker-rm match unobserved time invariant e¤ects. This is important because
while in the individual xed-e¤ects models (columns (i) and (ii)) the e¤ect of the reform is
identied from both the individuals who stay in the same rm and those who move rm after
the policy change, in the match xed-e¤ects specications (column iii), the e¤ect is identied
only from variation over the time period for individuals who stay in the same rm. This ensures
that unobserved changes in composition of employment are not driving our results. In sum,
education (university degrees in particular) became more valuable after the deregulation reform.
Table 8 reports results of similar specications using skill levels, instead of educational
attainment levels. The estimates suggest that the "on the spot rm" reform is associated with
an increase in returns to skill. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between high-skill level and
the experiment dummy is estimated at around 3% and is always statistically signicant across
the di¤erent model specications. This suggests that the reform is associated with an increase
in the wage premium for high-skilled workers of around 3%. The increase in the premium for
medium-skilled workers, however, is smaller (below 1%) and of uncertain signicance, while the
least skilled appear to have lower wages in treatment municipalities by half to one percent.
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[Table 8 about here]
7.2.1 Robustness
As mentioned in section 3, entrepreneurs are not obliged to register a new rm in the muni-
cipality of the companys location. Although according to the Institute of Registration and
Notarization, and discussed in Branstetter et al. (2010), the share of rms registered outside
their municipality is "trivially small", in this section we address that concern by aggregating
municipalities to the district level. Portugal is divided in 20 districts which are the largest
geographic subdivision of Portugal with administrative and judicial authority. Given their size
and administrative authority, it is very unlikely that an entrepreneur would register a company
outside of its district.
Therefore, we test the robustness of our results to dening the reform dummy at the district
level. To this end, we dened a new treatment dummy, Spotrt; which takes the value 1 in the
years when and after the rst one-stop shop was introduced in a district.25 Therefore, Spotrt is
a regional indicator for the introduction of the reform (instead of a municipality indicator). We
then substitute this for Spotmt in equation (4), leaving everything else the same. Results from
estimating this new equation with di¤erent combinations of xed e¤ects (as described in the
previous section) are reported in Table 9. They are consistent with those obtained previously,
suggesting that the introduction of the business registration reform within regions increased
the returns to education and skill. When we consider the existence of regional "on the spot"
rms, we obtain a wage premium of about 5-6% to university graduates, and of about 4-5% to
highly-skilled workers.
[Table 9 about here]
In sum, we have found a positive association between the business registration reform and
increased competition. We have also identied wage premia for better educated workers, and
larger premia for higher levels of educational attainment; we have also identied wage premia
for highly skilled workers. The e¤ects are estimated from within worker variation in the period
after the reform. Alternatively, we include worker-rm xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ects
from individuals that stay in the same rm after the reform. Results are therefore not driven by
changes in employment composition, and are supportive of education becoming more valuable
after the reform.
25Municipalities are sub-units of districts. In our sample there are 263 municipalities and 20 districts.
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8 Conclusion
This paper uses a matched employer-employee dataset of the universe of private sector rms
and workers in Portugal and a comprehensive episode of rm entry deregulation, unique in the
industrialized world, as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the e¤ects of the deregulation
on rm entry and how the resulting increase in competition a¤ects the returns to skill and
education. Prior to 2005 starting a new business in Portugal involved 11 procedures and 78
days, with a cost of around 13.5% of GDP per capita. In 2005 new legislation created the
"on the spot rm" (Empresa na hora) program with the purpose of reducing the time, cost
and complexity of starting a business. This initiative established one-stop shops where an
entrepreneur can register a company in less than an hour in one o¢ ce with a cost of around 3%
of GDP per capita.
We start by investigating the e¤ect of the program on rm entry and industry competition.
Our results suggest that the reform increased the creation of new rms, and decreased industry
concentration ratios and HerndahlHirschman indices. We then use the business registration
reform as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the e¤ects on the returns to education
and skill. We exploit cross-municipality-year variation in the implementation of the business
registration reform for identication. Our results suggest that the reform increased the wage
premium of university graduates by around 5%, and that of being a high-skilled worker by
around 3%. Less educated and low skilled workers, on the other hand, appear to have lost
slightly from the reform.
We estimate several specications of the wage model, controlling for di¤erent types of time
invariant unobserved e¤ects, and for industry-specic e¤ects; in particular, we are able to allow
for worker-rm (match) xed e¤ects and thus identify the e¤ects solely from individuals who stay
in the same rm after the reform. This is strongly indicative that we have identied a price e¤ect
rather than one driven by individualschanges in employment: that is, education and skills seem
to have become more valuable after the reform. The "On The Spot Firm" reform implemented
in Portugal in 2005 provides an exceptional context to evaluate the e¤ect of comprehensive rm
entry deregulation. Given the general evidence that competition-enhancing policies increase
innovation and growth (Aghion et al., 2009), evaluating the e¤ects of a precisely dened policy
such as this is important for future policy advice to other countries.
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10 Tables
Table 1: Sample size
Year All rms Start ups % Start ups Workers
"On the spot"
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
2002 210,367 11,067 1,834,497
2003 217,618 13,316 1,881,599
2004 223,084 12,787 1,938,520
2005 239,992 14,677 22.94 2,103,552
2006 241,397 15,039 47.73 2,134,839
2007 246,282 16,299 57.47 2,191,564
2008 249,695 16,833 73.69 2,241,624
2009 242,861 14,049 72.97 2,159,665
Total 1,871,296 114,067 42,567 16,485,860
Source: Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
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Table 2: Summary statistics: means of covariates for whole sample, by educational levels and
skill groups
All Education levels Skill levels
Covariate Workers ISCED1 ISCED2 ISCED3 ISCED56 Low Medium High
Ln(real hourly wage) 1.54 1.32 1.45 1.67 2.28 1.25 1.45 2.15
Education (baseline: ISCED1)
ISCED2 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.14
ISCED3 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.27
ISCED56 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.42
Skill level (baseline: low skill)
Medium 0.41 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.15
High 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.28 0.78
Women 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.38 0.40
Age 38.03 41.98 34.89 34.29 35.52 36.68 38.20 39.92
Tenure 7.67 9.07 6.70 6.60 6.05 5.96 8.05 9.76
Closed-end contract 0.27 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.36 0.24 0.17
Occupation (baseline: non-qualied workers)
Equipment operators 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.03
Production and related 0.22 0.37 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.18 0.34 0.08
Clerical & sales 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.07
Admin & managerial 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.34 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.13
Professional & Technical 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.31
Directors & Sc Specialists 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.53 0.02 0.01 0.37
ln(size of rm) 4.21 3.86 4.23 4.59 4.80 4.29 3.90 4.62
CR5 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.18
Ownership status (baseline: private national)
Public 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.08
Foreign 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.14
Exporter 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.40 0.42 0.53
Multi-plant 0.37 0.28 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.37 0.33 0.46
"On-the-spot" municipality 0.41 0.33 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.40 0.38 0.47
No. of observations 16,485,860 7,424,601 3,530,852 3,530,340 2,000,067 6,071,208 6,681,779 3,732,873
Note. Means were computed using only observations with non-missing values for all covariates (estimation sample). Source: Own
calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2009).
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Table 3: E¤ects of industry concentration, on the returns to skill and education
Industry concentration and returns to skill
CR5-employment and returns to skill HHI-employment vs returns to skill
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Medium 0.128*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.148*** 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.038***
(0.025) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
High 0.711*** 0.149*** 0.091*** 0.078*** 0.708*** 0.137*** 0.077*** 0.065***
(0.058) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.035) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
CR5(HHI) -0.045 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.026* -0.003 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.021*
(0.049) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.044) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012)
Med*CR5(HHI) 0.069** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.036*** 0.082** -0.029*** -0.028** -0.033***
(0.033) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.033) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
High*CR5(HHI) -0.009 -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.005 -0.046*** -0.040*** -0.038***
(0.080) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.073) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
R2 0.54 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.54 0.10 0.10 0.12
Industry concentration and returns to education
CR5-employment versus returns to education HHI-employment versus returns to education
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
ISCED2 0.164*** -0.003 -0.010** -0.008 0.184*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.007
(0.021) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
ISCED3 0.358*** 0.020*** -0.012 -0.013 0.363*** 0.024*** -0.010 -0.013
(0.039) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.026) (0.005) (0.014) (0.013)
ISCED56 0.956*** 0.168*** 0.080*** 0.049*** 0.934*** 0.177*** 0.084*** 0.050***
(0.047) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016) (0.035) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018)
CR5(HHI) -0.012 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.002 0.035 0.024* 0.026** -0.004
(0.038) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.036) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
ISCED2*CR5(HHI) 0.056* 0.016** 0.014* 0.007 0.042 0.020 0.021* 0.011
(0.032) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.035) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
ISCED3*CR5(HHI) -0.002 0.015* 0.011 0.003 -0.037 0.022 0.025* 0.017
(0.053) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.050) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
ISCED56*CR5(HHI) -0.066 0.020 0.012 0.004 -0.071 -0.002 0.008 0.003
(0.096) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.090) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
R2 0.54 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.54 0.09 0.09 0.12
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable, all specications include as observed covariates: tenure and age (and their
squares), industry and year dummies as in Table 2, and year e¤ects. Column (i) includes indicator for gender. Column (iv)
includes as further regressors: the occupation and type of contract of the worker; the ownership status and the log of size of the
rm, whether rm is multi-plant or exporter. ISCED 1 - up to primary education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED 2 - lower
secondary education, (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 - upper secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6 -higher
education (over 15 years of schooling corresponding to university degrees). Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in
parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: E¤ect of the "On the spot rm" program on rm creation
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on # of rm start-ups (linear)
(i) (ii) (iii)
On the spot rm 2.357*** 2.870*** 3.479***
(0.652) (0.773) (0.921)
Constant 1.620*** 0.369*** 0.491**
(0.416) (0.116) (0.195)
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on # of rm start-ups (negbin)
On the spot rm 0.898*** 1.040*** 1.341***
(0.076) (0.071) (0.081)
ME 2.357*** 2.886*** 4.262***
Constant 0.482* -0.454*** -0.389***
(0.257) (0.013) (0.061)
Industry  Yes Yes
Year   Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the number of new rms created. One
observation per municipality, industry and year corresponding to 54,839
records. ME stands for the marginal e¤ect of the on the spot rm. Ro-
bust standard errors, clustered by industry, in parenthesis. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: E¤ect of the "On the spot rm" program on industry concentration ratios - CR5
EMPLOYMENT
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on CR5 (linear)
(i) (ii) (iii)
on the spot rm -0.087*** -0.132*** -0.167***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 0.800*** 0.794*** 0.775***
(0.032) (0.002) (0.002)
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on CR5 (fractional dep.var)
on the spot rm -0.279*** -0.553*** -0.708***
(0.055) (0.033) (0.039)
ME -0.868*** -0.143*** -0.185***
Constant 0.843*** 0.848*** 0.765***
(0.113) (0.006) (0.011)
SALES
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on CR5 (linear)
on the spot rm -0.137*** -0.205*** -0.252***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.019)
Constant 0.674*** 0.572*** 0.552***
(0.043) (0.003) (0.004)
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on CR5 (fractional dep.var)
on the spot rm -0.357*** -0.722*** -0.902***
(0.064) (0.040) (0.040)
ME -0.137*** -0.212*** -0.262***
Constant 0.450*** 0.211*** 0.137***
(0.118) (0.006) (0.016)
Industry  Yes Yes
Year   Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the CR5 concentration ratio for
employment (top panel) and sales (bottom panel). One observa-
tion per municipality, industry and year corresponding to 54,839
records on employment regressions, sales regressions have 53,121
records. ME stands for the marginal e¤ect of the "on the spot
rm". Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in paren-
thesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: E¤ect of the "On the spot rm" program on Herndahl Index (HHI)
EMPLOYMENT
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on HHI (linear)
(i) (ii) (iii)
on the spot rm -0.083*** -0.153*** -0.189***
(0.020) (0.012) (0.014)
Constant 0.410*** 0.274*** 0.253***
(0.035) (0.002) (0.004)
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on HHI (fractional dep.var)
on the spot rm -0.222*** -0.496*** -0.609***
(0.053) (0.028) (0.028)
ME -0.083*** -0.150*** -0.180***
Constant -0.227** -0.607*** -0.672***
(0.089) (0.003) (0.013)
SALES
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on HHI (linear)
on the spot rm -0.089*** -0.151*** -0.182***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.014)
Constant 0.329*** 0.166*** 0.150***
(0.031) (0.002) (0.005)
E¤ect of "on the spot rm" on HHI (fractional dep.var)
on the spot rm -0.265*** -0.533*** -0.636***
(0.053) (0.031) (0.030)
ME -0.089*** -0.145*** -0.169***
Constant -0.444*** -1.003*** -1.059***
(0.087) (0.003) (0.017)
Industry  Yes Yes
Year   Yes
Note: The dependent variable is the Herndahl-Hirschman In-
dex (HHI) for employment (top panel) and sales (bottom panel).
One observation per county, industry and year corresponding to
54,839 records. ME stands for the marginal e¤ect of the "on
the spot rm". Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in
parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: Quasi-natural Experiments: E¤ect of the "On the spot shop" on returns to education
Returns to Education
(i) (ii) (iii)
Spot -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ISCED 2*Spot 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ISCED 3*Spot 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ISCED 56*Spot 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ISCED 2 0.003* 0.003* -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ISCED 3 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ISCED 56 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.053***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Medium-skill 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
High-skill 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.071***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
municipality FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. Further worker co-
variates include: tenure and age (and their squares), occupation, type
of contract of employment. Further rm covariates include: the log
of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status.
ISCED 1 - up to primary education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED
2 - lower secondary education, (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 - upper
secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6 -higher edu-
cation (over 15 years of schooling corresponding to university degrees).
All specications have the same number of observations: 12,489,080.
Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in parenthesis. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 8: Quasi-natural Experiments: E¤ect of the "on the spot rm" on the returns to skill
Returns to Skill
(i) (ii) (iii)
Spot -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium-skill*Spot 0.007** 0.007** 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High-skill*Spot 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Medium-skill 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
High-skill 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.058***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
ISCED 2 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ISCED 3 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ISCED 56 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.077***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
municipality FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes 
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. Further worker co-
variates include: tenure and age (and their squares), occupation, type
of contract of employment. Further rm covariates include: the log
of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status.
ISCED 1 - up to primary education (up to 6 years of schooling);
ISCED 2 - lower secondary education, (9 years of schooling); ISCED
3 - upper secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6
-higher education (over 15 years of schooling corresponding to univer-
sity degrees). All specications have the same number of observations:
12,489,080. Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in paren-
thesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 9: Quasi-natural Experiments: E¤ect of the "on the spot rm" per REGION on the
returns to education and skill
Returns to Education
(i) (ii) (iii)
Spot -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ISCED 2*Spot 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ISCED 3*Spot 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
ISCED 56*Spot 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.054***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ISCED 2 0.001 0.001 -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ISCED 3 0.012*** 0.011*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ISCED 56 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Returns to Skill
(i) (ii) (iii)
Spot -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Medium-skill*Spot 0.008** 0.008** 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
High-skill*Spot 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.040***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Medium-skill 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
High-skill 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.046***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
municipality FE Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes 
Match (worker-rm) FE Yes
Note: Log-hourly real wages as dependent variable. Further worker co-
variates include: tenure and age (and their squares), occupation, type
of contract of employment. Further rm covariates include: the log
of size of the rm, the ownership, multi-plant, and exporting status.
ISCED 1 - up to primary education (up to 6 years of schooling); ISCED
2 - lower secondary education, (9 years of schooling); ISCED 3 - upper
secondary education (12 years of schooling); ISCED 5/6 -higher edu-
cation (over 15 years of schooling corresponding to university degrees).
All specications have the same number of observations: 12,489,080.
Robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in parenthesis. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 1: "On the Spot Firm": introduction of one-stop shops by year and municipality
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A Appendix
Table A.1: SIC2 - Industries
Industry %
15 Manuf. of food, beverages & tobacco 3.32
17 Manuf. of textiles 2.52
18 Manuf. of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 3.17
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; Manuf. of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harnes & footwear 1.75
20 Manuf. of wood & prods of wood & cork, except furniture; Manuf. of straw & plaiting materials 1.35
21 Manuf. of pulp, paper and paper products 0.45
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.21
24 Manuf. of chemicals & chemical prods; Manuf. of coke, rened petroleum prods & nuclear fuel 0.92
25 Manuf. of rubber and plastic products 0.86
26 Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products 1.89
27 Manuf. of basic metals 0.36
28 Manuf. of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 2.71
29 Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c 1.28
31 Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.68
32 Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.48
33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.21
34 Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.12
35 Manuf. of other transport equipment 0.27
36 Manuf. of furniture; others manufacturing activities, n.e.c. 1.67
37 Recycling 0.12
40 Electricity, gas & water 0.47
41 Water collection, treatment and distribution 0.14
45 Construction 11.88
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 3.51
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 7.14
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and HH goods 9.95
55 Hotels and restaurants 7.10
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 2.80
61 Water transport 0.08
62 Air transport 0.42
63 Supporting & auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies and other tourist assistance 1.34
64 Post and telecommunications 1.50
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 2.77
66 Insurance, pension funding and other complementary activities of social security 0.53
67 Activities auxiliary to nancial intermediation 0.24
70 Real estate activities 0.84
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and HH goods 0.28
72 Computer and related activities 0.94
73 Research and development 0.10
74 Other business activities 9.77
80 Education 2.33
85 Health and social work 6.10
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 0.18
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 1.24
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 1.10
93 Other service activities 0.92
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Table A.2: Classication of Workers according to skill levels
Level Tasks Skills
1. Top executives (top man-
agement)
Denition of the rm general
policy or consulting on the or-
ganization of the rm; stra-
tegic planning; creation or ad-
aptation of technical, scientic
and administrative methods or
processes
Knowledge of management
and coordination of rms
fundamental activities; know-
ledge of management and
coordination of the funda-
mental activities in the eld
to which the individual is
assigned and that requires the
study and research of high
responsibility and technical
level problems
2. Intermediary executives
(middle management)
Organization and adaptation
of the guidelines established
by the superiors and directly
linked with the executive work
Technical and professional
qualications directed to
executive, research, and
management work
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as direc-
ted by the superiors, but re-
quiring the knowledge of ac-
tion processes
Complete professional qualic-
ation with a specialization
4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high tech-
nical value and dened in gen-
eral terms by the superiors
Complete professional quali-
cation with a specialization
adding to theoretical and ap-
plied knowledge
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks,
usually not repetitive, and
dened by the superiors
Complete professional qualic-
ation implying theoretical and
applied knowledge
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well dened tasks, mainly
manual or mechanical (no in-
tellectual work) with low com-
plexity, usually routine and
sometimes repetitive
Professional qualication in a
limited eld or practical and
elementary professional know-
ledge
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally de-
termined
Practical knowledge and easily
acquired in a short time
8. Apprentices, interns, train-
ees
Apprenticeship
Note: Hierarchical levels dened according to Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Lima and Pereira, 2003).
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